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INTRODUCTION
On November 24, 2010,' San Francisco's Board of Supervisors (hereinafter
"the Board") enacted an ordinance banning the bundling of toys with children's
meals that do not meet specific nutritional requirements.2 The Board faced strong
public and political opposition to the passage of the ordinance, even from those
that typically support anti-obesity and other public health initiatives. San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom vetoed the ordinance, for "[d]espite [the
ordinance's] good intentions, [he could not] support this unwise and
unprecedented governmental intrusion into parental responsibilities and private
choices." Ultimately, there was sufficient support on the Board to override
Newsom's veto, and the ordinance passed. Though the Board won the political
fight over enacting the ordinance, the success of the regulation in the domain of
public opinion is much less certain.
Since the ordinance was first proposed, it has drawn intensive public
criticism. Its opponents perceive the regulation as an unwelcome intrusion of
governmental authority into the private realms of personal responsibility and
individual choice. Most vividly, the California Restaurant Association opposed
the legislation through images, depicting a child with a toy in handcuffs with the
headline, "Who Made Politicians the Toy Police?" This public outcry against the
invasion of the "nanny state" is nothing new, yet the divisiveness over this
ordinance is quite puzzling in light of its relatively narrow impact on actual
consumer choices. Even with the ordinance, consumers can choose the exact
same combination of food items as they would have before. The only difference
is that now, if a consumer chooses an unhealthy combination meal, he or she will
have to buy the toy separately. Therefore, the ordinance is more accurately
characterized as creating an incentive to provide healthy children's meals, not as
a ban against unhealthy children's meals, as these options are still available.
1. The Board of Supervisors first passed the ordinance on November 2, 2010. See Eric Mar,
Opposing View on Child Obesity: Put Kids' Health First, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-11-09-editorial09_STI_N.htm. (San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom vetoed the ordinance on Friday, November 12; see Michael
Martinez, Mayor Vetoes San Francisco Ban on Happy Meals with Toys, CNN (Nov. 12, 2010, 8:33
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/l1/12/california.fast.food.ban/index.html. The Board of
Supervisors voted on November 23 to override the veto 8 to 3. Rachel Gordon & Heather Knight,
Supes Override Meal-Toy Veto, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2011, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-1 l-
24/bay-area/2494361 1 y1veto-meal-toy-drug-companies. The ordinance took effect in December
2011. Id.
2. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, §§ 471.1-.9 (2010), available at http://www.sfbos.
org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinances I 0/o0290- I 0.pdf.
3. Martinez, supra note 1.
4. Poster, Cal. Rest. Ass'n, Tough on Crime?, available at http://www.calrest.org/go/CRA/?
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In this Note, I argue that the debate over the San Francisco ordinance is not
about the actual effects of the law, but instead is about the law's expressive value
and how this symbolic meaning affirms or challenges the values of different
groups in society. Supporters of the ordinance primarily have a solidaristic
worldview, meaning that they look to governmental and other societal-level
remedies to address problems. Opponents of the ordinance, however, have
primarily an individualistic worldview, meaning that they prioritize individual
choice and personal responsibility in problem solving. I argue that because of this
dichotomy in ideologies, supporters of the San Francisco ordinance cannot rely
on the traditional method of persuasion in the public health context-the
approach of simply relying on the dissemination of positive scientific evidence to
shape public opinion. This traditional approach will further polarize, not
persuade, the ordinance's opponents, who prioritize individual autonomy over
systematic governmental interventions. Rather, to be successful the ordinance's
supporters need to respond to their critics by directly addressing the expressive
nature of the ordinance debate. Such an approach requires two steps. First,
ordinance supporters should challenge their individualistic opponents'
assumption that the children's meal ordinance limits individual choice. Second,
rather than fighting their opponents' claim that the ordinance is destroying
consumer economic interests in having the maximum number- of consumer
choices, the supporters need to reframe the debate's discourse to show how the
ordinance promotes consumer protection interests in health and safety. The
purpose of this refraining is not to ignore the legitimacy of consumer economic
interests but to bring attention to consumer protection interests. Though
consumer protection interests are critical, as of yet, they have not been at the
forefront of the ordinance debate.
In Part I, I begin to develop this argument by laying out the discursive
frameworks used by the opponents and supporters of the children's meal
ordinance. Section L.A demonstrates how critics focus on the symbolic meaning
of the ordinance, while Section I.B shows how supporters focus on the actual
impacts of the ordinance.
In Part II, I utilize cultural cognition theory to demonstrate how cultural
worldviews shape public responses to the arguments of both supporters and
opponents of the ordinance. Section IL.A defines the individualistic and
solidaristic cultural worldviews in more detail and shows how these worldviews
parallel the different ideologies on both sides of the ordinance debate. Section
II.B argues that individuals will evaluate the persuasiveness of information
presented by each side based on the information's conformity to their cultural
worldviews. Furthermore, the perceived cultural identity of the supporters and
opponents of the ordinance themselves plays a key role in the debate, and San
Francisco's highly salient liberal identity critically limits the city's proposals
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In Part III, I sharpen and extend my focus on the individualistic cultural
worldview, which presents a key challenge for the supporters of the ordinance.
Specifically, Section III.A examines causal misattribution and weight bias, both
of which are generated by an individualistic cultural worldview and bar the
arguments of the ordinance supporters from gaining traction. Section III.B briefly
explores some causes for the prevalence of an individualistic worldview in
American society. Having developed an understanding of the individualistic
worldview through this prior analysis of its causes and effects, I then, in Section
III.C, turn to the strategic response that supporters of the ordinance should adopt.
This Section argues that supporters should move beyond the traditional public
education approach and directly address the expressive nature of the law. I draw
from the history of tobacco regulation to show that reversing even deeply
entrenched cultural values is possible.
In Part IV, I lay out two principal ways that supporters of the ordinance
should directly engage the expressive nature of the debate. Section IV.A
challenges the assumption that the ordinance necessarily reduces informed
decisionmaking. Instead, independent, informed decisionmaking is already
limited by consumers' lack of understanding of basic nutritional sciences and
food marketers' attempts to mislead consumers and usurp parental authority.
Moreover, I contend that the ordinance actually increases the number of
meaningful consumer choices and that, even if it did limit individual choice,
there are three countervailing policy considerations that would still justify
passing of the ordinance. Section IV.B argues that supporters of the ordinance
should reframe consumer interest to prioritize consumer protection interests in
health and safety, and considers some of the possible challenges that the United
States faces in making this shift. Reframing the debate may be particularly
difficult because the debate implicates other highly sensitive cultural issues in
American society, such as the possible contribution of working mothers to the
obesity crisis and the correlation of unhealthy diets with specific racial groups.
Despite these challenges, numerous historical examples demonstrate that it is
possible to shift to different conceptions of consumerism through careful,
deliberative advocacy. Focusing on the Progressive Era, I analyze both the
general shift from producerism to the rise of American consumerism and the
specific shift within the producerist sphere from a laissez-faire individualism to a
more bureaucratic state that prioritizes the dignity of laborers as a class. Just as
the Progressive Era's changes were a necessary response to the rapidly shifting
class relationships triggered by industrialism, changes today are necessary to
adapt to shifts in our relationship with food driven by technological
"advancements" in food production. Accordingly, additional government action,
such as the ordinance, is necessary to enable us to make meaningful, informed
choices as consumers.
Section IV.C then addresses a possible criticism to my central proposal-
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namely, the criticism that calling for supporters to directly address the expressive
values of the ordinance is illiberal and undemocratic. Critics may argue that
supporters should still favor the traditional public education strategy, since
statistical and scientific explanations are more rational and legitimate than
debating the cultural values of different societal groups. However, I argue that
the opponents of the ordinance are already engaged in public moralizing, and,
more importantly, I apply Max Weber's theory of knowledge formation to show
that addressing the expressive moral values of the ordinance does not necessitate
either illiberal or biased decisionmaking.
After addressing this primary concern, I conclude by arguing that physicians
are the stakeholders who should lead the efforts in refraining the expressive value
of the ordinance debate. While San Francisco is limited by its ultra-partisan
cultural identity, physicians are uniquely situated in that they have the
professional authority, legitimacy, and broad acceptability to lead this policy
campaign. To convince the public that the overconsumption of fast food is a
public, rather than individual, crisis, advocates need to go beyond public
education and focus on the expressive moral values of their claims. Physicians
are in the prime position to lead this charge.
I. RHETORICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO ORDINANCE DEBATE
To an outsider, the controversy over the San Francisco ordinance may seem
disproportionate to the ordinance's relatively limited impact on consumers'
actual consumption choices. Specifically, while the ordinance prevents a fast
food chain from bundling the sale of an unhealthy children's meal together with a
toy as a single menu item, the ordinance does not ban the sale of either the toy or
the unhealthy meal alone. Consequently, customers can still choose to purchase
both items simultaneously, they just need to order them separately. Functionally,
the ordinance is not so much a ban, but rather a change in the default children's
meal from an unhealthy to a healthy option. In other words, the healthy meal
combination is the standard default option, but the unhealthy meal combination is
5. Note that there is the need to worry about whether the ordinance will effectively narrow
consumer choice if in fact the future price of buying the two items separately is much higher than
the current bundled cost. While it is impossible to predict exactly how fast food restaurants will
change their pricing options in response to the ordinance, as it does not become effective until
December 2011, it is unlikely that the cost of the unhealthy meal and toy separately will be much
greater than the bundle, as fast food restaurants are not principally trying to profit from the sale of
the toy, but instead wish to use the toy as an incentive to attract children to purchase the rest of the
bundle. See e.g., Tom Stewart, The Negative Effects of Child-Centered Marketing for Fast Food,
HELIUM, http://www.helium.com/items/1483355-fast-food-ads-fast-food-marketing-fast-food-and-
children-fast-food-health (last updated Jan. 7, 2010) (stating that toys in children's meals are a key
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still available if customers take the initiative to purchase the toy separately.6 The
effects of the ordinance can be further circumvented not only by consumers, but
also by the fast food restaurants themselves. Fast food restaurants can effectively
nullify any cost barriers to purchasing the toys separately by selling them for
only a nominal fee.' Given the relative ease with which restaurants can structure
their purchasing options around the law and customers can purchase the
unhealthy meal and toy as separate items, the ordinance effectively cannot force
change in consumers' resulting meal choices.
In spite of its minimal impact, the ordinance has generated extensive
controversy. In this Part, I describe the discursive frameworks surrounding this
debate. The first Section of this Part argues that critics of the ordinance are
opposed to the expressive value of the ordinance, not its actual impact.
Oppositely, the second Section argues that the supporters of the ordinance are
primarily focused on the ordinance's actual impact on childhood obesity rather
than on the ordinance's symbolic meaning.
A. Opponents of the Ordinance
Opponents of the children's meal ordinance object to the fact that the law
supposedly limits individual choice.8 However, in this Section, I show that their
criticism focuses not on the actual effects of the law on actual consumer choices,
but on what they perceive the law to be expressing about individual choice. For
example, Restaurant Association spokesman Daniel Conway framed his
objections to the ordinance in explicitly expressive terms, claiming that San
Francisco's ordinance was "sending the message that parents are making the
wrong choices, and therefore, they should no longer have that choice." 9 In
addition to consumer choices, others recognize that the impact on producers is
similarly of a symbolic nature: "The fallout from San Francisco won't be
6. Trevor Hunnicutt, Happy Meal Ban Passed: San Francisco Says No to Toys, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/BusinessfLatest-News-Wires/2010/1103/
Happy-Meal-ban-passed-San-Francisco-says-no-to-toys ("If the kids want the toys, they can still
get the toys.").
7. See id. (arguing that while it is impossible at this point to predict exactly how fast food
restaurants will respond to the ordinance, they are unlikely to charge a large separate fee for the
toys, which are mostly used as a promotional item to incentivize children to purchase the children's
meals).
8. See, e.g., Liz Robbins, If the Meal Is Too Fatty and Salty, a City Council Proposal Would
Take the Toy Away, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9504EOD61F3CF935A35757COA9679D8B63 ("This proposal robs parents of choice.").
9. Byron Ginsburg, Mixed Message from Mar(s), FREETOCHOOSEOURMEALS.COM (Oct. 1,
2010), http://www.freetochooseourmeals.com/tag/san-francisco-toy-ban; see also Frank Miele,
Freedom of Choice: Just Another Thing We've Lost?, DAILY INTER LAKE, Nov. 21, 2010,
http://www.dailyinterlake.com/opinion/columns/frank/article_48c II e9c-f50f- II df-b52b-
001cc4c002e0.html (framing the McDonald's ordinance as a loss of liberty and freedom of choice).
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financial -- there are just 19 McDonald's in the city. Instead, it's symbolic." "o In
fact, for some opponents, that the law lacks actual impact and is just "legislation
that pushes the boundaries of government for purely symbolic reasons," renders
the law even more offensive.'1
Critics have explicitly noted that the actual impact of the ordinance is
relatively narrow in that it does not force consumers to change their fast food
consumption preferences. For example, critics have argued that the ordinance is
simply a case of "liberals unleash[ing] their coercive urges" that "will probably
have no effect on the health of San Franciscans" 2 Other critics have argued that
focusing on fast food restaurants is misguided in general, as it is simply an
expressive "sideshow" from the actual arenas where the childhood obesity battle
should be fought-in schools' 3 and in homes.14 Specifically, critics of the
ordinance have also recognized the ease with which customers can circumvent
the law, by arguing the following:
The anti-Happy Meal campaign is a silly, self-congratulatory
exercise; removing the toy is not going to send consumers
flocking to Whole Foods. They will still go to McDonald's, buy
a burger and fries without the box, and perhaps ask the cashier
for whatever movie-themed promotional trinket lies behind the
counter.' 5
Similarly, other critics have noted that customers can also avoid the law by
simply going to one of the many fast food restaurants that lies just beyond the
10. Melanie Warner, San Francisco's New Ordinance: The Beginning of the End for Happy
Meal Toys, BNET (Nov. 3, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://www.bnet.com/blog/food-industry/san-francisco-
8217s-new-ordinance-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-happy-meal-toys/1935.
11. Benjamin Wachs & Joe Eskenazi, How the Happy Meal Ban Explains San Francisco, S.F.
WEEKLY, Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.sfweekly.com/content/printVersion/2330057; see also
Matthew Bastian, Sad Tale of the Happy Meal, TIMES (Trenton, N.J.), Dec. 20, 2010,
http://www.nj.com/opinion/times/oped/index.ssf?/base/news-1/1292827538253910.xml&coll=5
("The anti-Happy Meal campaign is a silly, self-congratulatory exercise; removing the toy is not
going to send consumers flocking to Whole Foods.").
12. Mona Charen, The Happy Meal Banners and Their Ilk, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 16,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/253332/happy-meal-banners-and-their-
ilk-mona-charen.
13. Unhappy Meal, BLADEN J. (Elizabethtown, N.C.), Nov. 22, 2010, http://www.bladen
journal.com/pages/fullstory/push?articleUnhappy+meal%20&id=10407558&instance=secondary_
opinionleftcolumn.
14. Michael O'Connor, Toying With Kids' Health, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 30, 2011,
http://www.omaha.com/article/20110130/LIVEWELL02/701309882/1161 ("Jim Partington of the
Nebraska Restaurant Association likened the toy debate to a 'sideshow.' Kids eat most of their
meals at home, he said, so improving nutrition there is key to combating obesity.").




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol12/iss1/4
RESHAPING THE FOOD POLICY DEBATE
perimeter of San Francisco and is not subject to the ordinance.,6
B. Supporters of the Ordinance
In contrast to the critics of the San Francisco ordinance, most supporters
primarily focus not on the expressive value of the ordinance, but rather on its
actual impact on obesity. To support this non-partisan public health position,
proponents of the ordinance base their claims on the results of scientific studies
and other forms of empirical evidence that highlight the severity of the childhood
obesity crisis and the ordinance's potential to be an effective solution. For
example, in the "Findings" section of the San Francisco ordinance, the text cites
numerous studies and surveys detailing the growth of the children obesity
epidemic in San Francisco, the impact of eating at fast food restaurants on
childhood obesity, and the effect of toy marketing on children's consumption
choices.' 7 In other words, the language of the ordinance focuses on the effects of
toy marketing on the childhood obesity crisis in San Francisco and the potential
impact of the ordinance in addressing this localized problem. Beyond the text
itself, supporters of the ordinance often refer to studies showing (1) that the rates
of childhood obesity have tripled over the last three decades' 8 and (2) that there
exists a causal relationship between childhood obesity and fast food
consumption.19 Supporters of the ordinance primarily frame the law in terms of
how it impacts the childhood obesity crisis rather than how it champions liberal
values.20
While primarily focusing on the law's potential impact, some supporters do
address the law's expressive and symbolic elements. Ross Mirkarimi, one of the
San Francisco supervisors who voted for the ordinance, said that "he is proud of
the board for 'pushing the envelope' with the legislation, which he said has
spurred discussion nationwide on the issue of healthy fast-food options and what
role local governments should have." 21 Likewise, other supporters have stated
that the law "will send a strong message to companies and force them [to] change
16. Meredith Jessup, San Francisco Takes the "Happy" Out ofHappy Meals, BLAZE (Nov. 11,
2010, 6:01 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/san-francisco-takes-the-happy-out-of-happy-
meals (noting "that anyone could circumvent the law easily: 'Someone doesn't have to travel very
far - a mile outside San Francisco - to get the traditional McDonald's Happy Meals experience').
17. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8 § 471.1 (2010), available at http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/
uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinancesI0/o0290-I0.pdf.
18. See, e.g., Overweight in Children, AM. HEART ASS'N (Mar. 29, 2011, 1:24 PM), http://
www.heart.org/HEARTORG/GettingHealthy/Overweight-in-ChildrenUCM_304054_Article.jsp.
19. Sarah Parsons, Unhappy Meals: San Francisco May Ban Toys with Kids' Fast Food,
CHANGE.ORG (Sept. 28, 2010, 12:53 AM), http://news.change.org/stories/unhappy-meals-san-
francisco-may-ban-toys-with-kids-fast-food.
20. See, e.g., id (focusing on the effect of unhealthy children's meals on health).
21. Dan McMenamin, Supes Override Veto of Fast Food Toy Ban, Should Go into Effect Next
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the way they do business." 22 However, many other supporters are sensitive to the
fact that framing the law in expressive terms could actually create more
resistance than support. These supporters are wary of highlighting that San
Francisco is intentionally pushing the boundaries, as it could trigger a push for
the city's outlier liberal tendencies to be resisted and reigned in.23 For example,
Eric Mar, the San Francisco supervisor who first introduced the ordinance, was
careful to explicitly describe the law not as a dramatic shift in policymaking, but
as a small, incremental step that is part and parcel of a broader package of food
policy proposals-such as menu labeling laws and improvements to school
lunches-that local governments had been enacting over the last decade. 24
The arguments adopted by both sides uncover the discursive frameworks
underlying the ordinance controversy, which in spite of their importance have
seldom been at the forefront of the debate.
II. THE ORDINANCE DEBATE THROUGH THE LENS OF CULTURAL COGNITION
THEORY
In this Part, I utilize cultural cognition theory to uncover the moral and
cultural beliefs underlying the ordinance debate. Fundamentally, the heart of the
debate is over which set of cultural worldviews the ordinance prioritizes, not
about the actual consequences of the ordinance. Cultural cognition theory also
reveals that individuals evaluate the persuasiveness of information based on the
information's conformity to their cultural worldviews, and San Francisco's
liberal identity could prevent its proposals from gaining widespread acceptance. I
develop this argument by first laying out the key provisions of cultural cognition
theory and then applying these provisions to the ordinance debate.
A. Individualistic Versus Solidaristic Cultural Worldviews
Cultural cognition theory refers to a number of social and psychological
mechanisms that collectively operate to ensure that our cultural beliefs are the
lens through which we perceive and make sense of objective information. 25 Even
when presented with the same facts, individuals with different cultural
22. David Orr, San Francisco Delays Vote on Controversial Toy Ban, CHANGE.ORG (Oct. 20,
2010), http://news.change.org/stories/san-francisco-delays-vote-on-controversial-toy-ban.
23. Eric Mar, Creating Access to Healthier Meal Options, YALE RUDD CENTER (Feb. 23,
2011), http://streaming.yale/edu/cmi2/opa/podcasts/healthand medicine/mar toy_02221 1.mp3;
see also Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REv. 115, 117-18 (2007)
(demonstrating with a number of historical examples that the more that a policy reflects relatively
extreme, outlier beliefs, the more danger there is that the supporters explicitly touting these beliefs
could polarize rather than convince their opponents).
24. Mar, supra note 23 ("This is a simple and modest policy that holds fast food
accountable.").
25. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
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worldviews will understand and process this information differently. However,
this is not a deliberate process; individuals are not consciously shaping their
responses to information to conform to their existing cultural worldviews. Rather,
individuals believe that they are "objectively" responding to information, but
their existing values affect how this process occurs. From the viewpoint of
cultural cognition theory, culture is not a bias consciously driving
decisionmaking, but instead it is an implicit and unconscious filter through which
individuals engage in rational information processing. 26 Numerous disciplines
use the term "culture" to reference a wide breadth of concepts, but cultural
cognition theory uses the term "culture" to refer specifically to the different types
of cultural worldviews, developed by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, that
frame how information is understood.2 7 Douglas and Wildavsky developed
multiple dimensions for classifying of cultural worldviews, but for the purposes
of this Note only the solidaristic versus individualistic dimension is relevant.2 8
People with an individualistic worldview "believe that individuals are
expected to secure their own needs without collective assistance" and "individual
interests enjoy immunity from regulation aimed at securing collective
interests." 29 Therefore, the opponents of the ordinance can be classified broadly
as having an individualistic worldview, for most believe that the ordinance is an
unnecessary governmental intrusion into the realms of personal responsibility
and individual choice.30 Oppositely, those with a solidaristic worldview believe
"collective needs trump individual initiative" and "society is expected to secure
the conditions of individual flourishing." 31 Therefore, supporters of the ordinance
can be broadly classified as having a solidaristic worldview, as most believe that
governmental intervention is necessary to address the problem of childhood
obesity.
The solidaristic versus individualistic distinction extends beyond the specific
context of the San Francisco debate. It also reflects the division in opinions
between the two sides of the broader debate on fast food regulations.32
Specifically, a survey of media reporting on fast food regulatory issues shows
26. Id.
27. Id. at 153 (citing MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 151.
30. Of course, this Note does not claim that every opponent to the ordinance has an
individualistic worldview. Rather, generally classifying opponents as having an individualistic
worldview and supporters as having a solidaristic worldview allows for the argument to illuminate
some of the key differences in the discursive elements of the debate. For examples of criticism that
the ordinance infringes on individual choice, see supra Section L.A of this Note.
31. Kahan & Braman, supra note 25, at 151.
32. It is beyond the scope of this Note to apply cultural cognition theory to the broader
regulatory debate. However, it is important to introduce this application of the theory to a new
field, as the well-developed body of research and analysis underlying cultural cognition theory can
substantially contribute to and inform the broader debate on fast food regulation.
181
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that local governments, consumer groups, nutrition and public health academics,
and medical lobby groups tend to favor an individualistic worldview that assigns
"responsibility to government, business and larger social forces" for regulating
the fast food industry. 3 On the other hand, food and advertising industries favor
an individualistic frame that focuses on individual parental responsibility for
monitoring and regulating the consumption of fast food.34
In sum, the views of the supporters and opponents do not just reflect
differences on the issues specific to the ordinance debate, but also much more
fundamental cultural worldviews over the proper delegation of responsibility
between individuals and society in general.
B. Biased Assimilation: How Cultural Worldviews Mediate Information
Processing
Clearly, the interests of the San Francisco Board align with a solidaristic
worldview, while the interests of the fast food restaurants align with an
individualistic worldview. The key issue, however, is how the general public
responds to the claims made by each side. Not surprisingly, cultural cognition
facilitates this process.
According to cultural cognition theory, people's responses to the facts and
arguments presented by both the supporters and opponents of the ordinance do
not depend solely on the substance of presented information. Rather, responses
also are predicated both on the source of information and on beliefs about that
source.3 5 In other words, a person is more likely to react positively to a given
piece of information if it comes from a source that the person perceives as having
a worldview in alignment with his or her own. This process, in which cultural
worldviews mediate how people process information, is known as "biased
assimilation." 36 Biased assimilation recognizes that individuals are not often in
positions to investigate personally a wide range of risks, and, therefore,
individuals have to rely on those whom they trust for risk assessment. Douglas
and Wildavsky note that people naturally trust those who share their values.37
Since the experts that people tend to trust generally share their cultural
commitments, the biased assimilation process often results in a reaffirmation of
one's own cultural worldviews. 38
33. Regina G. Lawrence, Framing Obesity: The Evolution of News Discourse on a Public
Health Issue, 9 HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POL. 56, 57 (2004).
34. Id at 64.
35. Kahan & Braman, supra note 25, at 151, 155-56.
36. See id. at 163-64 (citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979)).
37. Id. at 151.
38. Beyond Kahan's cultural cognition theory, this phenomenon has been widely studied and
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Furthermore, the link between cultural worldviews and credibility "is not
severed by disconfirming empirical information."39 "[R]ather than update their
prior beliefs based on new information, [individuals] tend to evaluate the
persuasiveness of new information based on its conformity to their experience."40
Individuals tend to dismiss claims as unreliable if they view them as originating
from a source that does not share their cultural commitments.4 1 In the ordinance
debate, San Francisco's salience as a "public communicator[] unmistakably
associated with particular cultural outlooks or stylesA 2 plays a critical role in the
public acceptability of the city's proposals, regardless of the substance of the
empirical information underlying its policies. To the extent that San Francisco is
viewed as a uniquely liberal entity largely unrepresentative of the rest of the
country, rather than as a "neutral" policymaking entity that reflects a range of
worldviews, the city's enactment of the ordinance is less easily acceptable to
those with a cultural worldview.
Indeed, other examples of the rhetoric used by the critics of the ordinance
demonstrates just how much biased assimilation plays a role in the San Francisco
ordinance debate. Specifically, many opponents have ignored the substance of
the law itself and have focused on the fact that it originated from San Francisco,
which they view as a bastion of unleashed liberalism with residents whose beliefs
are misaligned with mainstream American political values.4 3 "The Happy Meal
ordinance is not at all surprising given San Francisco's famously liberal
leanings."44 As one commentator wrote, "The uber-bohemians of San Francisco
love this sort of thing; others, maybe not so much."45 More importantly, other
existing views and to ignore data that contradicts those views. The term confirmation bias was first
developed by Peter C. Watson. See P.C. Waston, On the Failure To Eliminate Hypothesis in a
Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129 (1960).
39. See Carl 1. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on
Communication Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 635 (1951); Kahan, supra note 23, at 121; Irving
Lorge, Prestige, Suggestion, andAttitudes, 7 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 386 (1936).
40. Kahan, supra note 23, at 121.
41. Id. (citing Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of
Evidence Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993), which
demonstrates this effect experimentally with a sample of trained statisticians).
42. Dan M. Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 297 (2010).
43. See, e.g., Charen, supra note 12, (citing the ban as an example of "[w]hen liberals unleash
their coercive urges"); Laurence D. Cohen & Gina Barreca, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happy
Meals, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Jan. 30, 2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-01-
30/news/hc-op-cohen-barreca-happy-0130-20110130_1_cheeseburger-column-tonka-trucks (des-
cribing the creators of the ordinance as "[t]he California nutballs"); Ronald V. Miller, Jr.,
McDonald's Happy Meal Lawsuit, MD. INJURY L. BLOG (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.marylandinjurylawyerblog.com/2010/12/mcdonaldshappymeallawsuit.html (refer-
encing "the liberal bastion of San Francisco").
44. Trevor Hunnicutt, Happy Meal Toy Ban Under Consideration in San Francisco,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2010 4:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/03/happy-
meal-toy-san-francisco-possible-ban_n 748456.html.
45. Charlotte Allen, Editorial, Stick a Fork in It, We're Done, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011,
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opponents have worried that San Francisco's law could infect other parts of the
country. 4 6 In response to the passage of the ordinance, "restaurant associations in
other states started lobbying lawmakers to ensure [that] the wicked nanny
government of San Francisco wouldn't spill over into their states." 4 7 As
evidenced by these quotes, opponents of the ordinance have not only objected to
the message of what the ordinance expresses, but also to the legitimacy of its
source.
Biased assimilation theory also suggests that the facts presented by more
"neutral" sources are more easily accepted. This is evidenced by comparing the
experience of San Francisco to that of Santa Clara County, California. Santa
Clara County passed an ordinance that banned the bundling of unhealthy
children's meals with toys six months before San Francisco passed its
ordinance.4 8 Though the Santa Clara ordinance was controversial, it generated
http://articles.1atimes.com/20 11/feb/13/opinion/la-oe-allen-congress-green-20110213.
46. Warner, supra note 10. The perception that San Francisco, and California more generally,
is a tipping point for regulatory "epidemics," see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How
LITrLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 7 (2000) (likening the birth of new trends and
phenomena to "epidemics"), is partially based on the fact that California has on multiple occasions
served as the nation's regulatory bellwether, see Ellen Fried & Michele Simon, The Competitive
Food Conundrum: Can Government Regulations Improve School Food?, 56 DUKE L.J. 1491, 1520
(2007) (describing California as a "policy bellwether"), and repeatedly so in food policy, see
Baylen J. Linnekin, The "California Effect" & The Future of American Food: How Calfornia's
Growing Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the State & the Nation, 13 CHAPMAN L. REV.
357, 373 (2010). For example, soon after San Francisco passed its menu labeling ordinance, see
San Francisco Moves Forward on Menu Labeling, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS (Mar. I1, 2008),
http://www.nrn.com/article/san-francisco-moves-forward-menu-labeling, California became the
first state to enact its own menu labeling requirements, see Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub.
Interest, California First State in Nation to Pass Menu Labeling Law (Sept. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200809301 .html. Other local and state governments soon followed
suit. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Philadelphia Passes Strongest
Nutrition Labeling Requirements for Chain Restaurant Menus (Nov. 6, 2008), available at
http://cspinet.org/new/200811061.html. This eventually led to the adoption of the Federal Menu
Labeling Law in 2010. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 34 3(q)(5)). David Vogel of
Berkeley's Haas School of Business has documented the "critical role of powerful and wealthy
'green' political jurisdictions in promoting a 'regulatory race to the top,"' generally known as the
"California Effect," in a number of regulatory arenas. See Linnekin, supra, at 373 (citing DAVID
VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 6
(1995)).
47. Erin Sherbert, Other States Trying To Dodge Happy Meal Ban Humiliation, SF WEEKLY:
BLOGS (May 10, 2011 12:42 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2011/05/happymeal ban.
php; see also Thomas Pardee, States of the Nation: Where To Watch and Why, ADVERTISING AGE,
Mar. 7, 2011, http://adage.coverleaf.com/advertisingage/20110307/?pg=2 ("'If a bad idea bubbles
up in one state, you'll see it in other states."'); Wachs & Eskenazi, supra note II ("But when you
put San Francisco's laundry list of bans alongside New York City's fatwa against trans fats,
Chicago's slavery disclosure ordinance . . . , or Seattle's mandatory composting laws . . . , it
becomes clear that a left-leaning pack of cities is fundamentally changing the role-and pushing
the limits-of local government.").
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nowhere near the level of nationwide interest that San Francisco's later ordinance
stirred up. From a consequentialist perspective, this imbalance is quite puzzling,
given that Santa Clara was the first to introduce this type of law. Moreover, Santa
Clara's law affects a much larger population-there are 805,235 people in San
Francisco 49 and 1,781,642 people in Santa Clara County.50 The contrast between
the public reactions to San Francisco's ordinance and Santa Clara County's can
be partially explained by the fact that with San Francisco, "[t]he actions of the
city's tiny population . . . often have an outsized impact on our national
consciousness and the political landscape."5' In other words, while Santa Clara
also is a part of outlying liberal California, it has less salience in the national
public imagination than San Francisco.
Finally, biased assimilation theory predicts that an individual will perceive
the depth of relevant subject-matter expertise to be secondary to a source's
perceived cultural commitments.52 Soon after San Francisco enacted its
ordinance, a mother of two from Sacramento, Monet Parham, filed a class action
lawsuit against McDonald's, claiming that the restaurant violated consumer
protection laws by using deceptive advertising tactics to target children. 53 Many
critics of the lawsuit viewed Parham's case as proof that San Francisco's
children's meal ordinance triggered a wave of consumers blaming fast food
restaurants for their own personal responsibility failures.54 Much of the criticism
of the case also focused on the fact that Parham was a regional program manager
for child nutrition matters and therefore not a "typical" California mother.55
Despite these attacks, as someone working directly in child nutrition, Parham
presumably had more knowledge about the causes and effects of childhood
obesity than a "typical" mother. However, Parham's expertise did not lead to her
being perceived as a more credible and legitimate litigant against McDonald's;
rather, the public perceived Parham as an agent of the radical California
regulatory regime, which tarnished her credibility as a "legitimate" plaintiff. The
reaction to Parham's lawsuit highlights the primacy of political partisanship over
scientific knowledge; individuals simply do not always operate in accordance
A, div. A18, ch. 22 (2010), available at http://www.sccgov.org/keyboard/attachments/BOS%20
Agenda/2010/April%2027,%202010/202926863/TMPKeyboard203040014.pdf.
49. State & County Quickfacts: San Francisco (City), California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0667000.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2011).
50. State & County QuickFacts: Santa Clara County, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06085.html (last updated Oct. 13, 2011).
51. Warner, supra note 10.
52. See Kahan, supra note 23.
53. Complaint, Parham v. McDonald's Corp., No. CGC-10-506178 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct., Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/mcdonald_scomplaint.pdf
54. See, e.g., Walter Olson, McDonald's Suit over Happy Meal Toys by California Mom
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with the principle that those who know the most about a subject matter should be
the ones who inform policy on it.
In sum, this Part reveals the primacy of cultural values to the ordinance
debate. The perception of the facts and arguments presented by supporters of the
ordinance is ultimately determined by the interaction of the cultural worldviews
of the public and the supporters' own perceived cultural identities.
III. CAUSES, EFFECTS AND RESPONSES TO AN INDIVIDUALISTIC WORLDVIEW56
This Part enumerates the challenges that an individualistic worldview
presents to proponents of the San Francisco ordinance. An individualistic
ideology prioritizes individual control and personal responsibility, greatly
emphasizing the role that individual action can have in determining weight
outcomes. Section III.A first explores two consequences of such beliefs, namely,
causal misattribution and weight bias, and Section III.B then examines some
potential causes for the prevalence of an individualistic worldview in American
society. Lastly, Part C introduces the strategy that supporters of the ordinance
should adopt to respond most effectively to those with an individualistic
worldview.
A. Consequences of an Individualistic Worldview: Causal Misattribution and
Weight Bias
There is widespread scientific consensus that personal responsibility is not
the predominant determinant of body weight. Determining causality for weight
outcomes is very complex; weight is driven by a multitude of interacting factors,
58including biology, genetics, personal responsibility and environment.
Moreover, the precise nature of these interactions still is largely unknown. 59 That
said, scientists have concluded that genetic factors play a primary causal role,
56. See Lucy Wang, Weight Discrimination: One Size Fits All Remedy?, 117 YALE L.J. 1900,
1904-06 (2008), for a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the obesity studies cited in this
Section.
57. See, e.g., GINA KOLATA, RETHINKING THIN: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WEIGHT LOSS-AND THE
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF DIETING 69-70 (2007) (quoting obesity researcher Mickey Stunkard as
saying that people assume that the overweight "really could lose weight if [they] settled down and
stopped being such . . . fat slob[s]"); Catharine Wang & Elliot J. Coups, Causal Beliefs about
Obesity and Associated Health Behaviors: Results from a Population-based Survey, 7 INT'L J.
BEHAV. NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 19 (2010) (finding that "72% of respondents endorsed
the belief that lifestyle behaviors have 'a lot' to do with causing obesity, whereas 19% indicated
that inheritance has 'a lot' to do with causing obesity").
58. Boyd A. Swinburn et al., The Global Obesity Pandemic: Shaped by Global Drivers and
Local Environments, 378 LANCET 804 (2011); Walker S. Carlos Poston II & John P. Foreyt,
Obesity Is an Environmental Issue, 146 ATHEROSCLEROSIS 201 (1999); Steven L. Gortmaker et al.,
Increasing Pediatric Obesity in the United States, 141 AM J. DISEASES CHILD. 535 (1987).
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explaining approximately seventy percent of individual variation in BMI.60
Accordingly, although important, individual choice is not the predominant
determinant of weight.
In spite of the substantial scientific consensus on the factors leading to
obesity, personal responsibility is disproportionately cited in public discourse as
the primary cause of obesity.6' This can be explained by cultural cognition theory
discussed above. When multiple causal factors exist for a given phenomenon,
people are likely to prioritize the cause most consistent with their cultural
worldviews, irrespective of scientific research.62 Consequently, the belief that
personal responsibility primarily causes obesity is particularly prevalent because
it is consistent with an individualistic cultural worldview, which prioritizes
individual choice and control.
Discrimination due to weight bias is another consequence of the belief that
being overweight largely is a failure of personal responsibility. Though an
individualistic worldview embraces the positive idea that an individual has the
power to shape one's own life, the darker corollary is that personal failures are
one's own fault. The more that individuals believe that body weight is entirely
within one's personal control, the more likely they are to negatively evaluate
others against on the basis of weight. 63 As a result of this weight bias,
overweight6 people openly are stereotyped as "mean, stupid, ugly, unhappy, less
competent, sloppy, lazy, socially isolated, and lacking in self-discipline,
motivation, and personal control." 65
Indeed, these stereotypes of overweight people are primarily judgments
about personal flaws and moral failings. Weight bias, unlike other forms of
discrimination, such as gender or race, cloaks its discriminatory nature by
framing weight gain as being within an individual's control. Framing weight as
simply a behavioral choice hides the true discriminatory nature of weight bias
60. Hermine H.M. Maes et al., Genetic and Environmental Factors in Relative Body Weight
and Human Adiposity, 27 BEHAv. GENETICS 325, 325 (1997) (analyzing various methodologies and
finding that an integrated model estimates a genetic contribution of sixty-seven percent).
61. Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Psychosocial Origins of Obesity Stigma: Toward
Changing a Powerful and Pervasive Bias, 4 OBESITY REVS. 213, 215-16 (2003).
62. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 23, at 131-42 (finding that this phenomenon occurs in
multiple fields and citing examples such as sodomy; drugs, guns, and smoking; and nuclear energy
and global warming).
63. Christian S. Crandall & April Horstman Reser, Attributions and Weight-Based Prejudice,
in WEIGHT BIAS: NATURE, CONSEQUENCES, & REMEDIES 83, 83 (Kelly D. Brownell et al. eds.,
2005).
64. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identifies as overweight an adult
whose body-mass index (BMI)-defined as weight in kilograms divided by the height in meters
squared-is between 25 and 29.9. See Overweight and Obesity: Defining Overweight and Obesity,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/defining.htmi (last
updated June 21, 2010). The CDC identifies as obese an adult whose BMI is thirty or above. See id
65. Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting and Coping with Weight Stigma: An
Investigation of Overweight and Obese Adults, 14 OBESITY 1802, 1802 (2006).
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and makes it more difficult to eliminate.
Another challenge in generating support for the ordinance is that even those
with expert knowledge and personal experience about obesity's actual primary
causes are still susceptible to causal misattribution and weight bias. According to
a recent study, healthcare professionals share the same prejudices against
overweight people as the general public. 66 Therefore, even though healthcare
professionals presumably have more access to, and a better ability to understand,
information about the causalities of obesity, these professionals' worldviews still
primarily drive their behavior and beliefs. Likewise, overweight individuals, who
presumably have more personal experience and understanding of the difficulties
of controlling weight through individual behavior, are also susceptible to weight
bias.67 Individuals' beliefs that weight is largely controllable may "help[] protect
against negative effects of stigma by making self-blame and negative attributions
less likely."68 The idea that personal choice is the key determinant of weight
outcomes, which is consistent with an individualistic worldview, can trump both
scientific knowledge and personal experience.
This myth of weight controllability also explains the apparent contradictions
in several obesity and obesity-related rate trends. Over the last three decades, the
obesity rate has risen consistently; "[t]he prevalence of obesity and overweight
among US children and adults has more than doubled since the 1970s, and the
rate continues to rise." 6 9 During this time, however, there has been no research
showing a concomitant decrease in personal responsibility values.7 0
66. Id. at 1806, 1808 (ranking "[ilnappropriate comments from doctors" as the fourth most
common type of stigmatizing situation and finding that physicians are the second most common
source of discrimination next to family members: among overweight survey respondents, sixty-nine
percent reported discrimination from a physician, and fifty-two percent reported experiencing such
discrimination multiple times).
67. Phebe Cramer & Tiffany Steinwert, Thin Is Good, Fat Is Bad: How Early Does It Begin?,
19 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 429, 447 (1998) (finding that overweight children can be
just as likely to stigmatize overweight children as non-overweight children). This phenomenon has
also been shown to exist with gun ownership. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of
Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 413, 452 (1999) ("Survey data show no significant correlation
between prior victimization or fear of victimization and positions on gun control. Nor can variation
in opinions about gun control be fully explained by variations in violent crime rates across space or
time or by variations in the perception of such crime rates. Whatever they say in public, those
involved in the gun control debate are not really motivated by beliefs about guns and crime.").
68. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 65, at 1813.
69. Youfa Wang & May A. Beydoun, The Obesity Epidemic in the United States-Gender,
Age, Socioeconomic, Racial/Ethnic, and Geographic Characteristics: A Systematic Meta-
Regression Analysis, 29 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REvs. 6, 22 (2007).
70. To the best knowledge of the author, there are no published studies showing that, over the
same period of time that U.S. obesity rates have increased, Americans value personal responsibility
any less. Rather, there do exist studies demonstrating that the United States places greater emphasis
on personal responsibility as compared with other countries, such as France. See, e.g., Abigail C.
Saguy et al., Social Problem Constnction and National Context: News Reporting on "Overweight"
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Simultaneously, there has been a rise in expenditures at fast food restaurants,7'
and multiple studies have shown a causal association among frequency of fast
food consumption and excess energy intake, weight gain, and obesity.72 In spite
of these trends, public opinion has shifted in the opposite direction, with the
prevalence of weight bias increasing, not decreasing. The psychological
mechanisms of cultural cognition explain this apparent contradiction. Consistent
with an individualistic worldview, people blame rising obesity rates as a failure
of personal responsibility. When overweight individualistic people turn to
analyzing themselves, however, their own personal experiences with weight
management may challenge this "myth of controllability." The fact that they are
themselves overweight, and yet presumably without major deficiencies in
personal responsibility, directly challenges their individualistic belief that weight
gain is a personal responsibility problem. This discomfort, which individuals
experience when they are presented with evidence contradicting their beliefs, is
known as "cognitive dissonance." 74 To prevent cognitive dissonance, individuals
may infer an alternative interpretation of the facts that does not conflict with their
individualistic cultural worldview. In this case, individuals may implicitly shift
their perceptions of what constitutes obesity downwards to conclude that they
themselves are not overweight, since they are not personally irresponsible.
Although admittedly speculative, this explanation provides a plausible account of
the rising prevalence of obesity and weight bias concomitant with a decrease in
individuals' propensity to self-identify as overweight. It also highlights how
strongly cultural worldviews can dominate in the face of directly contradicting
information.
B. Possible Causes of an Individualistic Worldview
Historically, Americans consistently have held a more individualistic
71. Eric Schlosser, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 3 (2004)
("In 1970, Americans spent about $6 billion on fast food; in 2001, they spent more than $110
billion.").
72. See, e.g., J. K. Binkley et al., The Relation Between Dietary Change and Rising US
Obesity, 24 INT'L J. OBESITY 1032, 1037 (2000) (finding a significant, positive relationship between
BMI and one's consumption of food at fast food outlets for both men and women); Biing-Hwan Lin
et al., Nutrient Contribution of Food Away from Home, in AMERICAN'S EATING HABITS: CHANGES
AND CONSEQUENCES 213, 236 (Frazio ed., 1999), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/aib750/aib7501.pdf (finding little nutritional improvement in foods consumed away
from home between 1977-78 and 19994-95); Megan A. McCrory et al., Overeating in America:
Association Between Restaurant Food Consumption and Body Fatness in Healthy Adult Men and
Women Ages 19 to 80, 7 OBESITY RES. 564, 570 (1999) (finding "a positive association between
restaurant food consumption frequency and body fatness").
73. Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and Update, 17
OBESITY 941, 941 (2009) (finding that "[t]he prevalence of weight discrimination in the United
States has increased by 66% over the past decade").
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cultural worldview than citizens of other countries. This Note does not detail the
circumstances of this history, as legal comparativists and historians have
extensively developed this analysis in other writings." Rather, this Section
focuses on more recent developments-how the concept of obesity expressed
through media and advertising reflects and then further entrenches an
individualistic worldview. These causal factors are important to detail, with
respect to both identifying avenues for future study and understanding how
supporters of the ordinance can most effectively frame their arguments.
How the media frames obesity likely has contributed to both the rising
prevalence of weight bias and the perpetuation of the belief that personal
responsibility is the primary cause of obesity. One study of the U.S. media's
depiction of the obesity crisis concluded that there was a fivefold increase in
media attention to obesity from 1992 to 2003. This news coverage commonly
framed obesity as a problem caused by a lack of personal responsibility as
opposed to societal level factors.77 Similarly, the media predominately focused
on individually versus socially (or environmentally) based solutions for solving
* * 78the crisis.
An individualistic worldview is perpetuated not just by "objective"
informational sources, such as news agencies, but also by numerous stakeholders
with direct financial interests in strengthening the dominance of an individualistic
worldview. Restaurants and food manufacturers commonly deflect their own
responsibility for contributing to the obesity crisis by emphasizing the need for
individuals to take ownership over their health by engaging in more physical
activity.7 9 The fast growing diet industry, whose annual revenues increased from
$33.3 billion in 199580 to over $55 billion in 2006,81 also has fueled the personal
responsibility discourse. Emphasizing that weight gain is a matter of personal
choice and responsibility is essential to the diet industry, which is premised on
the idea that individuals can take full control of their weight by buying the
"right" products and procedures. Therefore, both "objective" news media and
advertisers have contributed to a rise in public exposure to obesity issues and the
personal responsibility narrative. Moreover, because of its increased public
salience, it appears that more members of society share an individualistic
75. See, e.g., Saguy et al., supra note 70, at 591-92.
76. Lawrence, supra note 33, at 64 (examining a sample consisting of numerous network
evening news programs and national newspapers, including the New York Times).
77. See id; Tatiana Andreyeva et al., Changes in Perceived Weight Discrimination Among
Americans 1995-1996 Through 2004-2006, 16 OBESITY 1129, 1133 (2008).
78. Andreyeva et al., supra note 77, at 1133.
79. Jeffrey P. Koplan & Kelly D. Brownell, Response of the Food and Beverage Industry to
the Obesity Threat, 304 JAMA 1487, 1487 (2010).
80. Andreyeva et al., supra note 77, at 1133 (citing MARKETDATA ENTERPRISES, THE U.S.
WEIGHT Loss AND DIET CONTROL MARKET (4th ed. 1996)).
81. Id. (citing MARKETDATA ENTERPRISES, THE U.S. WEIGHT LOSS AND DIET CONTROL
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worldview than is actually the case.82 The "availability heuristic"-the
phenomenon of individuals being more likely to conform to cultural worldviews
that they perceive to be dominant despite their original convictions-has further
entrenched the prevalence of an individualistic worldview.83
In sum, there are numerous, powerful stakeholders whose actions and
interests directly align with the individualistic worldview held by opponents of
the ordinance. To effectively advocate for the continued existence of the
ordinance, its supporters cannot focus solely on disseminating neutral scientific
information.
C. Supporters'Responses to an Individualistic Worldview: The Need for Change
In the San Francisco ordinance debate, supporters did not sufficiently
address the expressive nature of the debate. Rather, the supporters primarily
employed "the obvious strategy for dispelling disagreement, and for promoting
enlightened democratic decisionmaking, [which was] to produce and disseminate
sound information as widely as possible."84 In doing so, the supporters hoped that
the "truth" would eventually drown out their competitors. Such an emphasis on
public education has been the long-standing approach of public health
organizations.8 5 However, this strategy is misguided because it ignores that the
core of the obesity debate is over competing cultural worldviews, rather than the
dissemination of key facts. If "the truth carries implications that threaten people's
cultural values, then holding their heads underwater is likely to harden their
resistance and increase their willingness to support alternative arguments, no
matter how lacking in evidence." 86 Therefore, supporters of the ordinance need to
change course and directly address the expressive elements of the ordinance
debate.
82. Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 149-
50 (2011) ("Individuals more readily impute expert knowledge and trustworthiness to information
sources whom they perceive as sharing their worldviews and deny the same to those whose
worldviews they perceive as different from theirs. As a result, information sources that share their
worldviews will be overrepresented in individuals' mental inventories of experts. If individuals
observe that a view they are predisposed to believe is in fact espoused by a disproportionate share
of the information sources whom individuals recognize to be 'experts' by virtue of such a cultural
affinity - as could happen if these putative experts are also subject to forces of cultural cognition -
individuals of opposing outlooks will end up with different impressions of what 'most' credible
experts believe." (footnote omitted)).
83. Id at 149.
84. Kahan & Braman, supra note 25, at 151.
85. See generally Peter Barton Hutt, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Food, Drugs, and Prod. Safety
Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the Association on
Food and Drug Officials of the United States (June 21, 1972), in Public Information and Public
Participation in the Food and Drug Administration, 36 Q. BULL. ASS'N FOOD & DRUG OFFICIALS
212 (1972) (advocating for greater public education and disclosure in relation to the Food and Drug
Administration).
86. Kahan, supra note 42, at 297 (2010).
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While an individualistic worldview is deeply entrenched in American
culture, even deeply entrenched worldviews can change. Specifically, the history
of tobacco regulation illustrates how advocates may use awareness and direct
engagement of expressive values to change public opinion and enact policy.8 In
1964, the Surgeon General issued a report strongly warning of the dangers of
smoking and condemning the practice." In response, public health officials
decided to use public education as their key strategy to combat smoking,
specifically focusing their efforts on disseminating the information from the
Surgeon General's report.89 However, the discovery and dissemination of
information on the harms of smoking did not spark much change; rather,
cigarette usage rates actually continued to rise through the end of the 1970s. 90
Similarly, consumer lawsuits against tobacco companies and efforts to regulate
smoking beyond warning requirements and television advertising bans all
stalled.9' Accordingly, scientific discovery of smoking's harms and the
subsequent dissemination of this information was a critical, but insufficient, step
in decreasing smoking rates and passing antismoking regulations.
Actual changes in consumer behavior did not occur until the symbolic,
cultural, and moral connotations of smoking also changed.92 Eventually, public
health advocates shifted their strategy away from educating the public about the
harmful effects of smoking to directly challenging the stereotypes of the typical
smoker's identity.9 3 Rather than focusing on the harmful effects of the act of
smoking, advocates refrained the identities of smokers from being cool and
desirable (e.g., the masculinity Marlboro Man) to morally and socially deviant.9 4
Only after the expressive and normative value of smoking changed did the
activity become socially unpopular, and real progress started to develop with
respect to both regulatory reform and changes in consumer behavior. Usage rates
dropped dramatically, and the U.S. government pushed through a wave of
antismoking regulations.9 5 A later Surgeon General acknowledged in retrospect
that "the diffusion of new knowledge [embodied in the 1964 Surgeon General's
Report] was impeded by the entrenched norm of smoking." 96 The smoking
87. The following treatment of tobacco regulation is based on the analysis of smoking in
Kahan, supra note 23, at 136-39.






94. Id. at 137-38 (citing Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy
Change: The Case ofSmoking and Guns, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 421, 436 (1999)).
95. Id at 137.
96. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
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example illustrates that, while people are responsive to scientific information,
awareness of cultural perspectives also is necessary to change. Regulators could
not make real progress in regulatory reform until they challenged the expressive
value of smoking through refraining.
Therefore, while the prevalence of an individualistic worldview presents
numerous challenges to supporters of the ordinance, the tobacco example
provides an encouraging illustration of how expressive strategies can transform
even dominant cultural worldviews.
IV. EXPRESS STRATEGIES TO BE EMPLOYED BY SUPPORTERS OF THE
ORDINANCE
This Part details two expressive strategies that supporters of the ordinance
should adopt. First, Section IV.A suggests that supporters of the ordinance can
directly breakdown their opponents' primary expressive claim, namely, that the
ordinance harms individual choice, by showing that the ordinance does not in
fact harm informed decisionmaking. Second, Section IV.B contends that, while
opponents of the ordinance assume that consumer economic interests are the
most important concern, proponents of the ordinance should argue that consumer
protection interests are more critical.
A. Challenging the Inherent Assumptions ofan Individualistic Worldview
Critics of the ordinance primarily are concerned with the fact that the
regulation encroaches on individual free choice. This argument assumes,
however, that prior to the ordinance's enactment, consumers were able to make
informed choices that reflected their preferences and desires. However, this
assumption was not true, for "[i]ndividuals' desires and preferences are not
always reflected in the choices they [sic] make. A lack of information, maturity,
or voluntariness can thwart the realization of desires."97 Specifically, substantial
evidence shows that consumers do not make informed decisions about fast food
consumption because they are not properly educated about the basic dietary
knowledge that is needed to critically assess encountered health and nutritional
claims. Further exacerbating this problem is that restaurants and food
manufacturers often use marketing strategies that are misleading and deceptive.
1. The General Public Lacks Health Literacy
Most Americans lack even a very basic understanding of nutritional science.
In 2003, the Surgeon General declared that individuals urgently need
fundamental education on basic "health literacy," defined as "the ability of an
97. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of
Smoking Regulations, 61 U. Prrr. L. REV. 419, 456 (2000).
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individual to understand, access, and use health-related information and
services."98 For example, a 2011 survey found that only nine percent of
Americans could accurately estimate the number of calories they should consume
in a day. 99 Likewise, in an all-female study, ninety-one percent of subjects were
unaware of the number of calories needed to gain or lose a pound of fat. 00 Even
nutrition experts have trouble accurately estimating restaurant food calories.
According to a recent study, experienced nutrition professionals underestimate
the caloric content of restaurant food by two hundred to nearly seven hundred
calories.o'0 Outside of estimating the absolute number of calories in food,
consumers struggle simply to determine the relative healthfulness of different
food items, as the "[d]ifferences in calories among various options are not always
intuitively obvious." 02 For example, a McDonald's cheeseburger and a large
fries contain fewer calories than a Starbucks blueberry muffin and a twenty-four-
ounce mocha Frappuccino.10 3 It is important to note that because all of this
research studied American adults, young children-the more relevant population
group for the San Francisco ordinance debate-are likely to have even less
nutritional knowledge.
2. Marketers Confuse Decisionmaking and Constrain Parental Authority
In addition to consumers' own lack of nutritional knowledge, food
producers' advertising tactics create a marketing environment that further
constrains individuals' abilities to make truly independent and informed choices.
First, many of the health claims found on food packing are inaccurate,
misleading, or even intentionally deceptive. Many food producers add heath
claims to their products, as these claims increase consumers' willingness to
98. Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, Acting Assistant Sec'y for the U.S. Surgeon Gen.,
Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Obesity Conference (June 10, 2003), available at
http:/l www.surgeongeneral.gov/news/speeches/obesity061003.htm.
99. INT'L FOOD INFO. COUNCIL FOUND., 2011 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY: CONSUMER ATTITUDES
TOWARD FOOD SAFETY, NUTRITION & HEALTH (2011), available at http://www.foodinsight.org/
Content/3840/2011%201FIC%20FDTN%2OFood%20and%2OHealth%20Survey.pdf.
100. Press Release: American Women Speak Out About Weight Loss and Their Thoughts on
Healthy Eating: Splenda@ Sweetener Products and SHAPE Magazine Team Up on Recent Survey
That Sheds Light on Weight Loss Perceptions (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.
prnewswire.com/news-releases/american-women-speak-out-about-weight-loss-and-their-thoughts-
on-healthy-eating-113202939.html.
101. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF A




103. Harold Goldstein & Eric Schlosser, Editorial, Putting Health on the Menu: Requiring
Fast-Food and Restaurant Chains To Post Calorie Information Wouldn't Hurt Them and Could
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purchase the food items.'1 However, studies have shown that consumers find
these claims misleading and confusing, and consequently they lead consumers to
generate inaccurate inferences from these claims. 0 5
Furthermore, many researchers have concluded that fast food advertisements
and promotions marketed to children are inherently deceptive because (1) young
children do not have the full mental development to understand the intent of
advertising and (2) many marketing strategies aim to foster emotionally based
and unconscious reactions. In other words, as stated by the President of the
American Pediatric Association, advertising that targets children is inherently
deceptive because children neither understand advertising nor have the cognitive
abilities to defend against such ads.'06 Moreover, even more directly misleading,
"the most common persuasive strategy employed in advertising is to associate the
product with fun and happiness, rather than to provide any factual product-related
information."10 7 In fact, McDonald's corporate spokesman Walt Riker has
explicitly stated that, "Ronald does not promote food, but fun and activity-the
McDonald's experience."' 08 The use of the toys in marketing children's meals-
the issue in the San Francisco ordinance debate-is a clear example of this type
of marketing strategy.
Critics of the ordinance may respond that, even if such marketing tactics
effectively influence children, this fact is largely irrelevant to the debate, as it is
the parents who should counteract such influence by exercising control and
authority over their children. However, food marketers-coining industry terms
such as "pester power," "the nag factor," and "kidinfluence"-intentionally and
openly encourage children to influence their parents' purchases.1 09 Food
104. Jennifer L. Harris et al., Nutrition-Related Claims on Children's Cereals: What Do They
Mean to Parents and Do They Influence Willingness To Buy?, 2 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 1 (2011).
105. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON CHILDHOOD OBESITY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.
SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CHILDHOOD OBESITY WITHIN A GENERATION 23, 25 (2010), available at
http://www.letsmove.gov/sites/letsmove.gov/files/TaskForce on
ChildhoodObesityMay2010_FullReport.pdf, Jennifer Pomeranz, Front-of-Package Food and
Beverage Labeling: New Directions for Research and Regulation, 40 AM J. PREVENTIVE MED., 382,
385 (2011); see also C. Elliot, Assessing 'Fun Foods': Nutritional Content and Analysis of
Supermarket Foods Targeted at Children, 9 OBESITY REvs. 368, 376 (2008) (discussing how more
"policy attention needs to be directed towards the fact that the very existence of a nutrition claim(s)
might be misleading").
106. Michele Simon, Why the Happy Meal Is a Crime-and Not Just a Culinary One, GRIST
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.grist.org/article/2011-01-24-why-the-happy-meal-is-a-crime-and-not-
just-a-culinary-one.
107. Clowning with Kids' Health: The Case for Ronald McDonald's Retirement, CORP.
ACCOUNTABILITY INT'L 8, http://www.retireronald.org/files/Retire%20Ronald%20Expose.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2011) (quoting Brian Wilcox et al., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, REPORT OF THE
APA TASK FORCE ON ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN 23 (2004), available at http://www.apa.
org/pi/families/resources/advertising-children.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. (quoting Caroline E. Mayer, McDonald's Makes Ronald a Health Ambassador,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at E1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Jennifer Pomeranz, Television Food Marketing to Children Revisited: The Federal Trade
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marketers devote substantial funds to researching how to optimize these
strategies. For example, one marketing study was explicitly designed to
determine a messaging strategy that most effectively induced children to nag
their parents to buy advertised products.''o Other marketers have created seven
categories of nagging tactics and even "categorize[d] parents according to
identified stress factors and conditions (such as income, marital status, and guilt)
that make a parent more vulnerable to the nagging of their children.""' The
prevalence of such intentional manipulation strategies is not to be
underestimated; one advertising executive essentially admitted that, "we're
relying on the kid to pester the mom to buy the product."" 2
Food marketers' strategies create strong counter to the San Francisco
ordinance critics' claim that the issue is simply one of exercising parental
authority, as the marketing strategies used to sell children's meals are targeted to
directly undermine this parental control. Courts have explicitly recognized that
this type of marketing interferes with parents' independent choices. For example,
in a case before the California Supreme Court, plaintiffs charged two advertising
agencies, General Foods Corporation and Safeway Stores, "with fraudulent,
misleading and deceptive advertising in the marketing of sugared breakfast
cereals.""13 In its decision, the court recognized that even though parents bought
the cereals, they "d[id] not exercise a totally independent judgment" in doing as a
result of their children's influence."14
3. Quality Versus Quantity of Choice
Not only are critics of the ordinance overly optimistic about the ability of
consumers to make independent, informed choices, they also mistakenly
prioritize the quantity of choices available to consumers without considering
whether consumers can successfully choose between meaningfully differentiated
items. For example, the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity
conducted a recent study of children's menu options from a sample of fast food
chains, including those with top sales in 2008 and 2009.' '5 The study found that
Commission Has the Constitutional and Statutory Authority To Regulate, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
98, 99 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I 10. Clowning with Kids' Health: The Case for Ronald McDonald's Retirement, supra note
107, at 17-18.
111. Id. at 17-18 (citing SUSAN LINN, CONSUMING KIDS: PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE
ONSLAUGHT OF MARKETING & ADVERTISING 34 (2004) and JAMES U. MCNEAL, KIDS AS
CONSUMERS: A HANDBOOK OF MARKETING TO CHILDREN (1992)).
112. Id. at 17 (emphasis added) (quoting How Marketers Target Kids, MEDIA AWARENESS
NETWORK, http://www.mediaawareness.calenglish/parents/marketing/marketerstarget kids.cfm
(accessed Feb. 19, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 663 (Cal.
1983) (superseded by statute on other grounds).
114. Id. at 674.
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of 3039 possible children's meal combinations, only twelve met nutrition criteria
for preschoolers and only fifteen met nutrition criteria for older children." 6
Therefore, almost all of the available choices failed to meet basic nutritional
guidelines, and consumers do not have the freedom to make choices among
meaningfully different alternatives to the extent that consumers value
healthfulness as a key criterion in making consumption choices.
Furthermore, if anything, the enactment of the ordinance is actually expected
to increase the number of meaningful choices available to consumers, as fast
food restaurants are likely to respond by increasing the number of available
healthy meal options. Fast food restaurants indeed have increased their healthy
options with the implementation of menu-labeling laws." For example, since
introduction of the menu-labeling laws, "Starbucks . . . has changed its 'default'
milk from whole milk to reduced-fat milk, . . . Dunkin' Donuts has a new lower-
calorie line[,] . . . and McDonald's has reduced the size of a helping of French
fries."' 18 Therefore, if the effect of the ordinance is to limit countless harmful
options while incentivizing an increase in the currently marginal number of
healthful options, the ordinance could actually play a positive role in increasing
the quality of available choices.
4. Policy Priorities that Justify Limiting Individual Choices
Even if the ordinance were to constrain individual choice, strong
countervailing policy considerations would still justify the law's enactment. First,
governmental intervention may be more necessary in cases where it is very
difficult for consumers to make personal risk determinations. Making accurate
risk assessments about food decisions is difficult, since the present benefit of
satisfying hunger and cravings is much more immediate than the future potential
harms, which include obesity and diabetes. In other words, the lack of temporal
proximity between the consumption of fast food and its ultimate cumulative
health effects makes it more difficult for individuals to exercise control and
responsibility in making healthy choices and risk assessments.
Second, studies showing that health and nutrition education may be
insufficient to motivate people to make healthy eating choices justify the need for
more direct government intervention. The intervention of governmental action, in
the face of systematic individual failures to act, has occurred frequently in other
public health and safety contexts, such as with mandated seatbelt laws.
AND MARKETING TO YOUTH 17 (2010), available at http://www.fastfoodmarketing.org/medial
FastFoodFACTSReport.pdf.
116. Id. at 48.
117. Kim Severson, Calories Do Count, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/29/dining/29calories.html?pagewanted=all.
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Specifically, for the ordinance debate, despite that "Americans are now aware of
the importance of good diet or nutrition due to public and private nutrition
information programs, it is becoming increasingly clear that nutrition knowledge
does not directly predict dietary behavior as those with more knowledge do not
necessarily change behavior."l" 9 Child-directed obesity regulations that are
dependent on personal self-sacrifice are likely to fail.12 0
Third, a growing amount of evidence shows that fast foods actually exhibit
addictive properties.121 There is strong support for the proposition that sugar, in
particular, can be addictive.122 Other studies have not only shown that there are
interactions between the neural pathways for appetite and cravings, but also that
food deprivation affects reward systems in the same way as drugs and other
addictive substances.12 3 If these research studies conclusively prove that fast food
is indeed addictive, this greatly weakens the argument that personal control and
responsibility are the only forces needed to regulate fast food consumption.
B. Reshaping Consumer Interests from Economic to Protectionist
In addition to challenging the belief that the ordinance is harmful to
individual free choice, advocates of the ordinance also should reframe the
priority they put on consumer protection interests, the framework that provides
the most compelling support for the ordinance. James Whitman provides a
classification of two different types of consumer interests that conceptually align
with the two sides of the ordinance debate-consumer protection interests and
consumer economic interests.12 4 Consumer economic interests are defined as
consumers' interests "in purchasing goods and services at the lowest possible
price, in having access to the widest variety of goods and services, in having easy
access to credit, in being able to shop at maximally convenient hours and
locations, and the like." 25 Consumer protection interests, on the other hand, are
119. Rodolfo Nayga Jr., Impact of Sociodemographic Factors on Perceived Importance of
Nutrition in Food Shopping, 31 J. CONSUMER AFF. 1, 1-2 (1997).
120. Cf Peter Barton Hutt, Regulatory Implementation of Dietary Recommendations, 36
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 66, 69 (1981) ("If health promotion and disease prevention programs
depend solely, or even primarily, on personal self-sacrifice and abdjuration, they are doomed to
failure.").
121. Roni Caryn Rabin, Can You Be Addicted to Foods?, N.Y. TIMES: WELL BLOG (Jan. 5,
2011, 11:57 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/can-you-be-addicted-to-foods.
122. See Nicole M. Avena et al., Evidence for Sugar Addiction: Behavioral and
Neurochemical Effects of Intermittent, Excessive Sugar Intake, 32 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 20, 32 (2008); Hollis Templeton, Food, Fitness, and Addiction, FITBIE,
http://fitbie.msn.com/lose-weight/food-fitness-and-addiction (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
123. Takashi Yamamoto, Brain Mechanisms of Sweetness and Palatability of Sugars,
NUTRITION REVS. S5, S5 (2003).
124. See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative
Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 366-67 (2007).
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supported by "consumer protection and safety legislation, that is, legislation on
such matters as products liability, the purity of food and drugs, nondeceptive
advertising, and the like."'2 Opponents of the ordinance frame their claims in
favor of supporting the economic interests of consumers. In response, supporters
of the ordinance should reframe the debate to focus on the protection interests of
consumers.
Prioritizing consumer protection interests over consumer economic interests
allows for a shift from a more solidaristic to a more individualistic conception of
the ordinance debate. Consumer economic interests align with an individualistic
worldview, as consumption is generally considered an individual's personal
choice.127 Oppositely, consumer protection interests align with a solidaristic
worldview, as health and safety concerns are generally framed as public health
issues.12 8 Therefore, this reframing would allow supporters of the ordinance to
address the public consequences of personal consumption.
Shifting to an emphasis on consumer protection interests also would
necessitate a shift in the level of risk born by society. The combination of a
regulatory approach and focus on consumer protection interests is termed the
"precautionary principle strategy," which is a means by which food is regulated
in the European Union.' 2 9 Under the precautionary principle, "when there is
scientific uncertainty as to the nature of [the] damage or the likelihood of the
risk" posed by some activity, "then decisions should be made so as to prevent
such activit[y] . . . unless and until scientific evidence shows that the damage will
not occur." 130 In other words, in the face of scientific uncertainty, regulators are
to err on the side of caution, even when there is no demonstrable risk. By
contrast, the dominant American approach is to prioritize consumer economic
interests, and consequently, "the American sovereign consumer model asks the
individual to accept significantly more risk in life than his European
counterpart."' 3 ' The U.S. model, however, fails to account for the fact that the
bearing of more risk may not lead to the socially optimal outcome for consumers.
The optimal level of risk ultimately is a cultural, rather than empirical, question.
126. Id. at 367.
127. Id. ("The spirit of law protecting the consumer economic interest ... idealizes the
consumer as sovereign.").
128. See Lawrence, supra note 33, at 58.
129. World Health Org. (WHO) Secretariat for the Fourth Ministerial Conference on Env't &
Health, Budapest, June 2004, Dealing with Uncertainty-How Can the Precautionary Principle
Help Protect the Future of Our Children (WHO, Working Paper No. EUR/04/5046267/11, 2004),
in WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN 15, 15 (Marco Martuzzi & Joel A. Tickner eds.,
2004), available at http://www.euro.who.int/ _data/assets/pdffile/0003/91173/E83079.pdf.
130. Cloning, 2002: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Servs., and
Educ., and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 19 (2002) (statement
of Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth).
131. Whitman, supra note 124, at 390.
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If consumers feel strongly that they do not want to run a given risk, even where
the evidence shows otherwise, the government should not impose that risk on the
population.132 A narrow conception of consumer interests that only focuses on
consumer economic interests, however, completely prevents a discussion of this
critical social issue.
1. Potential Challenges to Establishing the Consumer Protection Interest
Framework
In addition to the relative dominance of the individualistic worldview in the
United States, there are also other aspects of American culture that may impede
deliberate attempts to reposition the meaning of consumer interest. Specifically,
it may be difficult for supporters of the ordinance to explicitly discuss the
expressive elements of the childhood obesity debate because this dialogue
necessarily engages a number of other political and sensitive societal issues.'33
For example, deep examination of the causes of childhood obesity prompts us to
awkwardly point the finger at parents, particularly working mothers.1 34 For some
feminists, it is a particularly uncomfortable notion that all of the gains that
women have made in the workforce in terms of gender equality and personal
empowerment may also have contributed directly to the rising rates of childhood
obesity.' 35 Some feminists may perceive of working mothers as "selfishly"
pursuing their own careers, leaving their children to eat junk food at McDonald's
instead of being "properly" cared for at home. Although the question of proper
parenting is massively important in American society, it also is not often openly
discussed, as parenting is viewed as a particularly private sphere that should not
be intruded upon by others' morals and values.
Another uncomfortable aspect of U.S. culture tied to the obesity debate is
that the core of American cuisine is often characterized by items such as
hamburgers, fries, and other particularly obesogenic foods that are often most
blamed for contributing to the obesity crisis.136 Indeed, some commentators
132. See Caroline E. Foster, Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the World Trade
Organisation's Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 427, 427
(2008).
133. This Note simply introduces these issues and a fuller analysis should be conducted
elsewhere.
134. John Cawley & Feng Liu, Maternal Employment and Childhood Obesity: A Search for
Mechanisms in Time Use Data, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13600,
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3600.pdf.
135. Bob Cutler, Keeping Kids Happy at No Cost to Mom: C3's Position on County of Santa
Clara Toy Ban, JENNINGS Soc. MEDIA 2 (May 7, 2010), http://
jenningssocialmedia.com/downloads/C3.SANTACLARAFinal.pdf (citing "dual-income families
resulting in less supervised time" for kids as contributing to the childhood obesity crisis).
136. See SIDNEY MINTZ, TASTING FOOD, TASTING FREEDOM: EXCURSIONS INTO EATING,
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explicitly have demonized anti-obesity efforts as anti-American.13 7  Other
individuals have sympathized with narratives knowingly glorifying the excessive
and unhealthful nature of fast food as symbolic of the rebellious, masculine
aspect of American identity.' Similarly, some obesogenic foods are associated
with specific racial identities, and, once again, political correctness creates great
discomfort with the singling out of a particular ethnic group's eating habits.139
Therefore, the expressive nature of the obesity debate can implicate questions of
race, gender, and national identity that make individuals unwilling to engage in
these conversations.
2. Factors Indicating Likelihood ofEstablishing the Consumer Protection
Interest
Though the previous discussion focuses on potential limitations to refraining
efforts, there are also other factors indicating that a shift in the United States
towards a more consumer protectionist approach is possible. Historical examples
show that shifts to different types of consumerism have been achieved through
careful and calculated advocacy. For example, the rise of American consumerism
in the early twentieth century was an intentional effort to create justice and social
peace in response to rising class tensions between labor and capital. 140 This
deliberate political program shifted people's conceptualizations of their primary
identities away from highly differentiated producer identities to a single
consumer identity with a shared common interest in buying "cheap" and "good"
products. 141
Another example contemporaneous with the rise of American consumerism
reveals that the United States already has managed to shift from a predominantly
individualistic to a solidaristic cultural worldview. This shift has occurred,
however, in the context of producer, not consumer, concerns. During the
137. See, e.g., Craig Lambert, The Way We Eat Now: Ancient Bodies Collide with Modern
Technology To Produce a Flabby, Disease-Ridden Populace, HARV. MAG., May-June 2004,
http://harvardmagazine.com/2004/05/the-way-we-eat-now.html.
138. Michael Benjamin, On Happy Meals and Individual Choices, EPOCH TIMES (May 5,
2011), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/opinion/on-happy-meals-and-individual-choices-55887.
html (arguing that San Francisco's ban is an example of the diminishing of the "[r]ugged
individualism [that] once typified that which was great about the American character. Today,
Americans have ceded their individual responsibility to government, politicians, and trial
lawyers").
139. See, e.g., SONYA A. GRIER, AFRICAN AMERICAN & HISPANIC YOUTH VULNERABILITY TO
TARGET MARKETING: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF DIGITAL MARKETING
(2009), available at http://digitalads.org/documents/Grier/ 20NPLAN%20BMSG%20memo.pdf;
Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8
MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 356-58 (2003) (discussing the fact that certain minorities
disproportionately consume certain harmful products and have higher rates of obesity than whites).
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Progressive Era, the rise of industrialism and the inequity between factory
owners and workers challenged the concept of "free" labor. Workers were "free"
to contract their labor to employers, but how much actual freedom and choice did
workers have in this exchange?1 4 2 Specifically, progressives repudiated the
"negative" liberties associated with a laissez-faire labor market, arguing that
"free choice in employment contracts did not make a worker more free if he
could choose only among terrible offers." 4 3 Instead, progressives argued for
"positive" liberty, in which the government would arrange economic life to
spread meaningful opportunities more broadly among its citizens.144 Therefore,
there was a shift away from traditional laissez-faire individualism and the myth
of self-reliance to a general acceptance of a solidaristic worldview that embraced
expert management.14 5 As Woodrow Wilson stated in The New Freedom, "[T]o
let the individual alone is to leave him helpless as against the obstacles with
which he as to contend." 4 6 Therefore, at least with respect to producer concerns
in the United States, there was a shift in the conceptualization of free choice as
more than a negative freedom from interference: free choice also came to be
viewed as a positive freedom to choose among attractive alternatives.147
However, progressives did not view this shift as rejecting individual choice
and democracy, but as simply adapting these values to modern conditions.14 8 In
many ways, this shift also signaled a return to the core of Adam Smith's
philosophies; even with his great respect for and optimism in free markets, Smith
always insisted that the free market be utilized in service of dignity and other
human values.14 9 Progressives did not see any inconsistencies with valuing both
free markets and dignity, for in the same speech in which Roosevelt "called for a
renewal of individualism and self-reliance, [he] announced that initiative and
energy alone could not sustain a complex economy."s'5o In this new complex
economy, a more developed bureaucratic state was necessary to create real
choice and dignity for laborers: a state that could allow autonomy and
vulnerability to mutually coexist. This historical example closely parallels the
current debate about consumer protections and shows that heightened state
intervention is not mutually exclusive with consumer choice.
Lastly, aside from the desirability of adopting cultural worldviews, there are
pragmatic factors that are also already pushing the United States to embrace
142. JEDIDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY 177 (2009).
143. Id. at 183.
144. Id. at 202.
145. Id. at 182.
146. Id at 183 (alteration in original) (quoting WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A
CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 284 (1913)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
147. Id at 202.
148. Id. at 183.
149. Id. at 189 (discussing values animating Adam Smith's ideology).
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consumer protection interests. Indeed, the EU approach to food safety legislation
is not solely driven by predominantly cultural worldviews, but also is in part a
purely pragmatic response to some recent food safety scandals. Therefore, as the
number of food safety incidences increase in the United States, citizens will
demand more food safety protections. Indeed, in the last several years, there have
been widespread food safety issues with high public saliency, including
salmonella contaminations of both tomatoes' 5' and peanuts that have caused
multiple deaths.152 Even with, or perhaps as a result of, great technological
advances in farming and other aspects of food production, there were still forty-
eight million cases of food-borne illness in the United States in 2010. 153
Therefore, the recent passage of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, which
is more focused on consumer protection interests than previous legislation, is
partially a direct, pragmatic response to these recent food safety scandals and
concerns. 154
a. Addressing the Iliberal Criticism ofReframing the Ordinance
Debate
However, beyond the issue of whether the prominence of the consumer
protection interest may be expanded, it is critical to address whether it should be
expanded. In this Subsection, I respond to a potential criticism of my central
proposal, which is that calling for supporters to directly address the expressive
values of the ordinance is prohibitively illiberal. Using an expressive framework
may be an effective strategy, but should it nonetheless not be adopted because is
it troublingly undemocratic to so openly value the cultural worldviews of a
specific sub-group? Even if the weight of scientific knowledge indicates that the
ordinance creates substantial community health and social benefits, does the
value of "unbiased" decisionmaking outweigh the potential health outcome
151. Tomatoes Pulled Off Shelves, Menus Amid Salmonella Scare, FOxNEWS.COM (June 19,
2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,364448,00.html.
152. Editorial, Dangerous Food, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
02/17/opinion/17tue l.html.
153. 48 Million US. Cases of Food-Borne Illness in 2010 Push Industry Toward RFID-
Enabled Food Safety Systems, SUPPLY & DEMAND CHAIN EXECUTIVE (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.sdeexec.com/web/online/FulfillmentLogistics-Trends/48-Million-US-Cases-of-Food-
borne-Illness-in-201 0-Push-Industry-toward-RFID-enabled-Food-Safety-Systems/15$13471.
154. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see Patrik Jonsson, Food Safety Bill 101: What Are the
Facts and Myths?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 23, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Politics/2010/l l23/Food-safety-bill-101-What-are-the-facts-and-myths (finding that the food
safety bill gives "the Food and Drug Administration more power to recall tainted products,
strengthen inspections of vegetable and meat processors, and demand that producers follow tougher
standards for keeping food safe"); Obama Signs Food Safety Bill, CNN (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-04/politics/obama.food.safety_1_food-safety-fda-power-commissio
ner-margaret-hamburg?_s=PM:POLITICS (describing the implications of the Act's passage).
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benefits? These questions highlight the tensions that frequently exist between
rational risk regulation and democratic decisionmaking.'5 5 Addressing this issue
is critical, as otherwise critics may forcefully argue that cultural cognition theory
leaves individuals either trapped between a state of illiberal and biased
policymaking or in an equally unfavorable nihilistic state of total inaction that a
strict form of cultural relativism can imply.
Democratic decisionmaking is associated with a general norm against
couching arguments explicitly in moral terms.'56 "Liberalism is famously
opposed to public moralizing, or at least to certain robust forms of it,"' 5 for
statistical and scientific explanation is perceived as more "rational," and
therefore more "legitimate," than naked appeals to values.'5 8 Consequently,
groups oftentimes do not resort to explicitly using expressive moral frames
except in "extreme" circumstances, such as when a law is passed that directly
challenges their beliefs, and they are placed in a defensive mode, as is the case
with the opponents of the San Francisco ordinance.' 5 9
However, Max Weber's theory of objectivity and subjectivity,16 0 which
rejects the notion that subjectivity inherently is antagonistic to accessing reality
and truth, shows that the role of subjectivity in knowledge creation does not
necessarily imply the existence of a problematic bias.161 Although developed in a
different historical and intellectual context, Weber's 1942 theory of knowledge
lends a normative justification for the subjective political decisionmaking that
necessarily results under cultural cognition theory. Weber believed that
subjectivity is what uniquely enables a meaningful and accurate account of the
world. 162
155. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation ofSunstein on Risk,
119 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1073 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)) (discussing the relationship between democratic
decisionmaking and rational risk regulation).
156. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
203 (1995) (describing the "range and variety of self-censorship common in liberal democratic
societies").
157. Kahan, supra note 67, at 478.
158. Id. at 446.
159. Id. at 493.
160. MAX WEBER, "OBJECTIVITY" IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL POLICY (1904), reprinted in
THE METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 49, 49-112 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. &
trans., Transaction Publishers 2011) (1949).
161. See id. at 57-58, 81-84.
162. While this Note focuses on the role of subjectivity in Weber's theory, it is critical to note
that Weber does not reject the existence of objectivity. Weber recognizes both objectivity and
subjectivity and argues that both are necessary for creating scientific study: empirical knowledge is
objective and retains its validity across individual variations in values, while value judgments are
subjective and are not universally consistent. See id. at 58, 80. However, Weber does separate the
two concepts, "insist[ing] on the rigorous distinction between empirical knowledge and value-
judgments," for objectivity and subjectivity each play a vital but distinct role in the process of
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Weber's theory describes reality as an infinite chaos that has no innate
significance, and accordingly there is no inherent principle for selecting the
subjects that science should pursue.163 Rather, the determination of what to study
is determined by the researcher, and this is an inherently subjective process, as
what the researcher believes is important to study is determined by the specific
values that the researcher holds.64 Therefore, subjectivity is necessary to
construct order and meaning in the world, and, consequently, all sciences are
subjective in the sense that they are dependent on values as determinants of their
objects of study.165 Accordingly, subjectivity should not be conflated with bias,
which connotes that a perspective is inaccurate and not as "true" as an unbiased
view. A subjective perspective means that the perspective is positioned from a
specific viewpoint that may not be universal across all individuals, but this does
not mean that this perspective is consequently untrue or otherwise deficient.' 66
Weber's theory of knowledge implies that all knowledge is necessarily
subjective, meaning that there is no single "true" understanding of the world that
is most accurate.167 Subjectivity therefore should be conceptualized more as an
enabling, vital step in knowledge production.' 68
This conceptualization of subjectivity as a perspective, rather than a bias, is
crucial to the San Francisco ordinance debate, because this approach refutes
critics' argument that the ordinance lacks legitimacy because it champions liberal
values. Opponents claim that, since the ordinance comes from San Francisco,
with its perceived radical liberal identity, it is problematically biased because it is
based on a particular cultural perspective rather than on objective social goals.169
In other words, the opponents object to the fact that ordinance represents
subjective liberal values, rather than objectively sound public health policies.
However, Weber's theory shows that subjective liberal values and objective
health policies are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as there exists no single,
true objective framework through which to understand the debate, only multiple
frameworks with differing perspectives. Also, in opposing the "cultural
partisanship" evident in San Francisco's policies, critics of the ordinance fail to
fully acknowledge how their differing cultural worldviews are driving their own
beliefs. 7 0
163. See id. at 62-62, 72, 82.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 84.
167.See id. at84, 111.
168. See id. at I 10-11.
169. See, e.g., Trevor Hunnicutt, San Francisco Supes vs. Ronald McDonald, Bos. GLOBE,
Oct. 2, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2010/10/02/sanfrancisco supes-vs
ronald mcdonald.
170. This phenomenon in which one can identify the subjective cultural basis of others'
perceptions without the ability to similarly recognize the cultural influences on one's own beliefs is
described by cultural cognition theory as "naive realism." See Kahan, supra note 23, at 130-31.
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In sum, Weber's theory provides an account of knowledge formation that
acknowledges the key role of subjectivity, but frames subjectivity positively as a
situated perspective rather than as a bias. This theory allows for both a more
nuanced understanding of the objections of the opponents of the ordinance and
support for the strategic response that I propose the supporters of the ordinance
should adopt.
CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS-RECRUITING PHYSICIANS AS POLICY
ENTREPRENEURS
This Note began as an exploration of why the passage of a relatively narrow
city ordinance generated such an intense national debate. Analysis of the
arguments on both sides reveals that the key division between supporters and
opponents of the ordinance is not about the actual effects of the ordinance, but
what the ordinance fundamentally symbolizes about the proper relationship
between individual responsibility and governmental intervention. Therefore, for
their arguments to gain broad acceptance, supporters of the ordinance must
explicitly address the expressive meaning of the ordinance. They must first
directly counter the assumption that the ordinance actually interferes with
individual choice and informed decisionmaking and then reframe the debate to
prioritize consumer protection interests over consumer economic interests.
Though this process is critical, it may be especially challenging, as liberal-
leaning groups generally are less likely than their conservative counterparts to
use explicit moral arguments.' 7' Indeed, as detailed earlier, opponents of the
ordinance already are framing their arguments in expressive terms, loading their
claims with highly salient expressive and value-based charges, framing the
ordinance as suffocating individual choice and discouraging personal
responsibility. It is imperative that proponents of the ordinance directly respond
to these expressive claims.
However, there remains the question of which stakeholders can best serve as
the "policy entrepreneurs," who will take the principal initiative and
responsibility for refraining the expressive value of the ordinance debate.
"Individuals reflexively reject information inconsistent with their predispositions
when they perceive that it is being advocated by experts whose values they reject
and opposed by ones whose values they share."'72 As previously discussed, San
Francisco's ultra-partisan cultural identity prevents those from opposing cultural
171. Kahan, supra note 67, at 489 ("[D]efections from the norm against public moralizing are
not uniform across moral commitments and cultural styles. Citizens who support egalitarianism and
civic solidarity are more likely to see appeal in liberal public reason, whether out of principle or
pragmatic calculation; citizens who support hierarchy and individualism tend to put little value on
liberal public reason and are in fact likely to be horrified by the suggestion that moralizing be
banished from political discourse.").
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views from accepting the city as a legitimate source of policy. Rather, people are
more receptive to experts whom they perceive to have values that are on both
sides of the debate.
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to fully analyze the landscape of
possible stakeholders in the ordinance debate, I propose that physicians are
uniquely situated to enact change in that they have the professional authority,
veracity, and legitimacy to serve as the entrepreneurs of a policy campaign.
Physicians have an accepted public role in "'advocacy for and participation in
improving the aspects of communities that affect the health of individuals,' and
they have a 'primary ethical and professional responsibility for the health of the
community members they serve."'"73 Indeed, this conceptualizes the role of the
physician as that of the scientist-citizen, someone who embodies both "the
scientific duty to see the factual truth as well as the practical duty to stand up for
his or her own ideals."' 74 In other words, the scientific and moral agent are dual
roles that are both necessary. Therefore, physicians can play a key role in leading
the consumer protection interest refraining.' 75
173. Roberta R. Friedman & Marlene B. Schwartz, Public Policy To Prevent Childhood
Obesity, and the Role of Pediatric Endocrinologists, 21 J. PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINOLOGY &
METABOLISM, 717, 723 (2008) (quoting Russell L. Gruen et al., Physician-Citizens-Public Roles
and Professional Obligations, 291 JAMA 94, 94 (2004)).
174. WEBER, supra note 160, at 58.
175. However, there is a fine line that should be observed. Though some insist that physicians
need to become much more political as a collective group, it is critical to not let their status as
partisans go too far, as currently their effectiveness in speaking to diverse cultural groups derives
from partially the fact that they are perceived of as politically neutral entities. See Kahan, supra
note 23, at 14547 (discussing the importance for "cultural vouchers," who are "individuals bearing
authority and credibility within their cultural groups," in enacting controversial legislation).
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